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Myanmar’s Civil Society – a Patch for the
National Education System? The Emergence of
Civil Society in Areas of State Weakness
Jasmin Lorch
Abstract
Civil society groups are among the most important private actors to fill some of the gaps that exist
in Myanmar’s education system. As the state-run education system deteriorates, civil society actors
develop alternative approaches to teaching and the provision of basic education materials. As its
subtitle suggests, this article argues that even though the military regime of Myanmar is highly
authoritarian, spaces for civil society actors do exist within two areas of state weakness: firstly,
within various sectors of the weak welfare state; and secondly, within some of the negotiated
spaces of relative ethnic autonomy in ceasefire areas. Against this backdrop, the emergence of
civil-society-based self-help groups in the education sector provides but one specific example of
a larger trend that is taking place in present-day Myanmar: The military regime has started to
tolerate certain civil society activities in areas of tremendous welfare needs that the government
is unable or unwilling to deal with itself.1 (Manuscript received February 1, 2007; accepted for
publication March 27, 2007)
Keywords: Myanmar, civil society, education system, military regime, development cooperation,
state failure
The Author
Jasmin Lorch is a doctoral candidate at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. In June 2005 she
graduated in political science from the Freie Universität Berlin. The findings of both her MA thesis
and her articles on civil society in Myanmar rest upon her own research trips to the country in the
summers of 2004 and 2006 and in early spring 2007. Her PhD focuses on the question of what
kind of state constitutes what kind of civil society, using Bangladesh and the Philippines as case
studies. Specifically, it seeks to analyse the effects of state weakness on national civil societies by
means of comparative analysis. Contact: j.lorch@gmx.de
1 A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Burma Studies Conference 2006 “Com-
munities of Interpretation” in Singapore, 13-15 July 2006.
55 55
55 55
Südostasien aktuell 3/2007 55
Studie
Myanmars Zivilgesellschaft – ein Lückenbüßer
für das staatliche Bildungssystem? Die
Entstehung von Zivilgesellschaft in Bereichen
schwacher Staatlichkeit
Jasmin Lorch
Abstract
Zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen gehören zu den bedeutendsten nichtstaatlichen Akteuren, die einige
der zahlreichen Lücken, die in Myanmars Bildungssystem existieren, notdürftig schließen. Wäh-
rend das staatliche Bildungssystem zusehends erodiert, entwickeln zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure
alternative Ansätze der Selbsthilfe, um Grundbildung zu vermitteln und unentbehrliche Lehrmate-
rialen bereitzustellen.Wie der Untertitel dieses Artikels impliziert, argumentiert die Autorin, dass
trotz der Repressivität des autoritären Regimes in Myanmar in mindestens zwei Bereichen, in
denen der Staat schwach ist, Handlungsspielräume für zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure existieren:
erstens in verschiedenen Sektoren des versagenden Wohlfahrtsstaates und zweitens in einigen der
ausgehandelten Autonomiegebiete der ethnischen Minderheiten. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt
die Entstehung zivilgesellschaftlicher Selbsthilfeinitiativen im Bildungsbereich nur ein Beispiel für
eine allgemeine Entwicklung dar, die gegenwärtig in Myanmar stattfindet: Das Militärregime hat
begonnen, in Bereichen, in denen enorme Wohlfahrtsdefizite herrschen, welche die Regierung
selbst nicht zu beheben in der Lage – oder willens – ist, zivilgesellschaftliche Selbsthilfeaktivitäten
zu tolerieren. (Manuskript eingereicht am 01.02.2007; zur Veröffentlichung angenommen am
27.03.2007)
Keywords: Myanmar, Bildungssystem, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Militärregime, Staatszerfall,
Zivilgesellschaft
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Frage nach den Auswirkung von schwacher Staatlichkeit auf die Konstitutionsformen nationaler
Zivilgesellschaften. Kontakt: j.lorch@gmx.de
56 56
56 56
56 Jasmin Lorch
1 Introduction
Since the military takeover in 1962, Myanmar has remained one of the world’s
most repressive regimes. A popular uprising led by the country’s students in 1988
was brutally suppressed and the military has tried to preserve its control ever
since. Consequently, the results of the 1990 election, in which the opposition
party National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, were and
remain ignored. However, in spite of this lasting political stalemate at the level of
high politics, some promising social dynamics are taking place at the grassroots
level: Civil society has begun to re-emerge in authoritarian Myanmar (e.g. South
2004,Heidel 2006, ICG 2001). While it is has long been assumed that the strong
military regime of Myanmar does not allow any room for manoeuvre, spaces for
civil society actors do exist within at least two areas of state weakness: Firstly,
within various sectors of the weak welfare state; and secondly, within some of the
negotiated spaces of relative ethnic autonomy in ceasefire areas (Lorch 2006a).
Against this backdrop, the emergence of civil society-based self-help groups in
the sector of education provides but one specific example of a larger trend that
is taking place in present-day Myanmar: The military regime has started to
tolerate certain civil society activities in areas of tremendous welfare needs that
the government is unable or unwilling to deal with itself.
An analysis of both the constraints and the enabling factors for the develop-
ment of civil society in Myanmar is fruitful for the international community
with regard to possible policy options. While the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has developed a policy of “constructive engagement” based
on non-interference, non-discrimination and consensus, the USA since 2003 has
implemented a policy of comprehensive economic sanctions (Burma Freedom
and Democracy Act of 2003). In view of the lasting political stalemate situation
it seems clear, however, that neither ASEAN’s constructive engagement approach
nor the US sanctions regime has led to substantial political reform in Myanmar.
The European Union (EU) has also opted for a policy of coercive diplomacy
and sanctions. However, according to the EU Council Common Position of
April 2006, it allows for both humanitarian aid and development aid in certain
circumscribed areas (EU Council Common Position 2006/318/CFSP of 27 April
2006).
The EU Council Common Position thus reacts to the severe humanitarian
crisis that is nascent in Myanmar. For years it has been assumed that about 40 per
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cent of the population live below the poverty line (Steinberg 2001:46). Epidemics
like HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria are on the rise. Other humanitarian
emergencies such as child malnutrition also seem to be steadily increasing. The
national crisis in the above-mentioned fields of health and development is severely
aggravated by the failure of the state-run education system. Indeed, in some rural
areas government schools do not exist at all. Moreover, aid workers and experts
active in the country assume that due to poverty more than 50 per cent of all
children drop out of school before they even finish the primary level. While
the humanitarian and social need for aid has been acknowledged in principle,
critics still argue that it does not reach the people and bring relief but rather
strengthens the military regime and therefore inhibits political change (ICG
2002a; ALTSEAN Burma 2002:9; 31-52). In this sense, the development of
civil society in Myanmar has to be discussed in relation to the broader picture
of the debate on humanitarian aid for the country. If it was possible to identify
local civil society actors in Myanmar this would help international donors, since
those domestic groups could be engaged as partners regarding the delivery of
humanitarian aid.
The education sector constitutes a particularly attractive field of possible
future engagement for international actors: If the international community could
engage with civil society actors in Myanmar’s education sector, this could be a
starting point for gradually changing the country’s authoritarian political culture.
Moreover, for the EU it would also be politically relatively uncontroversial to
engage with civil society actors in the education sector. According to Article 5 of
the EU Council Common Position, projects and programmes in the areas of good
governance, capacity building of civil society, health, environmental protection
and education are off the ban of development aid. Against this backdrop, the
article focuses on an analysis of what room for manoeuvre is available for civil
society actors in the education sector and how this can be strengthened. After
providing an overview of the multifaceted spectrum of civil society initiatives
in the field of education, the author tries to answer the question of whether
civil society has the potential to patch up Myanmar’s education system. Unless
otherwise indicated, the findings presented in this article rest upon the author’s
own research trips to Myanmar in the summers of 2004 and 2006 and in early
spring 2007. In most cases sources of information have been made anonymous
in order to protect the people interviewed.
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2 Conceptualising Civil Society under Authoritarian Rule:
Towards a Relational Understanding
Research into civil society developments in authoritarian Myanmar requires a
particularly sound theoretical conceptualization. The more so as the concept of
civil society is itself deeply contested,most notably because it has both descriptive
as well as normative dimensions (Guan 2004:1). Conventional definitions of civil
society have laid emphasis on its normative dimensions deriving from democratic
theory. In this sense, civil society is closely associated with a sphere autonomous
from the state and the market. Civil society associations are defined as being
characterized by voluntary participation, tolerance, discursive procedures of
decision-making and horizontal networks. Correspondingly, they are assumed
to generate mutual trust and democratic values and to consequently promote
democracy (for an overview see Edwards 2004). However, such definitions
of civil society have often been criticized as being inapplicable to non-Western
cultural and national contexts (e.g. Lewis 2001)1.
In order to describe civil society in Southeast Asia and its emergence under
authoritarian rule, it is more useful to emphasize the empirical analytical dimen-
sions of the concept (Wischermann 2005:203; Croissant/Lauth/Merkel 2000:10).
Used in a primarily analyticalway, any definition of civil society has to take into ac-
count the specific political and cultural context in which it operates. A relational
approach2 seems a fruitful approach to this endeavour, as it consequently relates
civil society to the scope of action it has. A democratic constitutional state is the
conditio sine qua non for an autonomous and democratic civil society to flourish.
In Myanmar, however, civil society emerges in the context of authoritarian
rule, which has profound consequences for the way it is able to constitute itself.
The cases of Vietnam and China have shown for example that in authoritarian
regimes that try to penetrate the social sphere, civil society organizations can
hardly achieve extensive autonomy of action (Heng 2004:145ff.). In contrast,
civil society actors frequently have to maintain functional ties with members of
the ruling establishment – or even let themselves become partially co-opted by
the latter (Yang 2004:13f.; Perinova 2005:6ff.; 28). If one wishes to study the
genesis of civil society under authoritarian rule, defining it as a sphere that is
1 Lewis refers to this critique, but he doesn’t share it.
2 For a more extensive elaboration on the relational approach see Lorch 2006a and 2006b.
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completely autonomous from the state and the market therefore misses the point.
In this sense, it is more useful to define civil society as a specific type of action and
interaction. According to this definition, civil society activities are characterized
– not only, but mainly – by self-organization and self-reliance, by their operating
in the public sphere, by using discourse as a means of resolving conflicts, by
tolerance of heterogeneity and pluralism, by their differing from violence and
war, and by their pursuit of the collective good (Gosewinkel/Rucht/van den
Daele/Kocka 2003:11).3 Defined as such, civil society is neither strictly confined
to any specific sector of society at large, nor will any real civic organiation have
all these ideal type characteristics. While the main characteristic of civil society
groups is the specific type of action and interaction they practise, their degree
of formality and their institutional forms may differ considerably. In this sense,
there are multiple examples of civil society associations such as advocacy groups,
registered charities and developmental NGOs, but also informal community
self-help groups and faith-based organizations (LSE 2004).
Likewise, this understanding of civil society allows for an analysis of its dark
sides (Lauth 2003:22). Civil society in authoritarian states is likely to mirror
features such as hierarchy and exclusiveness. Similarly, vertically structured
relationships as well as religious and ethnic cleavages in society as a whole are
bound to be found in civil society organizations as well (Croissant 2000:360;
Howell 1999:17). In other words, apart from the dominating type of action and
interaction defined as being the main characteristic of civil society, other modes
of action and interaction – such as hierarchical procedures of decision-making or
exclusiveness and intolerance towards outsiders – can also prevail within specific
civil society organizations. When looking at voluntary civil society groups which
are based on faith or ethnicity – such as Christian church organizations or ethnic
culture groups – this aspect becomes particularly evident. While these groups
might practice a certain degree of tolerance among their own membership and
dedicate themselves to the collective good of their respective communities, they
might at the same time be exclusive towards or even discriminate againstmembers
of other religious or ethnic groups.
3 Author’s translation.
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3 The Scope of Action for Civil Society in Myanmar: Locating
Gaps in the Authoritarian System
Any analysis of the scope of action available to civil society actors has to take
into account both the constraints and the enabling factors that could potentially
create a suitable environment for civil society activities.
There can scarcely be any doubt that there are considerable structural imped-
iments hindering the emergence of civil society in Myanmar (Steinberg 1999;
Liddell 1999). Since the crackdown on the popular demonstrations that took
place in 1988, the Tatmandaw4 has been expanded (ICG 2002b:1-5). Intelligence
capacities to spy on the population have also been enhanced and modernized
(Ball 1998:91-125). Moreover, Liddell has described the legal constraints on civil
society inMyanmar by saying there is “no room to move” (Liddell 1999:54). The
development of free and independent civil society associations is restricted by the
lack of fundamental civil liberties (ibid.). Moreover, all publications are subjected
to strict censorship (ibid:59) and to counter attempts at individual expression
the regime controls an extensive propaganda machine including newspapers and
television channels.
Nevertheless, in spite of all these constraints, civil society-based self-help
groups have been emerging in areas where the authoritarian state is weak or
failing.5 Where the state fails to provide essential governance services such as
basic welfare, civil society actors try to develop alternative self-help approaches
to tackle the needs of their respective communities.
3.1 Enabling Factors for Civil Society – Areas of State Weakness
Modern definitions of the state attribute three core functions to it: firstly, to
provide for the security of the population and control the state’s territory;
secondly, to provide for the welfare of the population, which includes state
activities in various sectors such as the economy, labour, health, education and the
environment; and thirdly, to generate legitimacy, allow for popular participation
and establish a democratic constitutional state (Schneckener 2004:12-14). If the
state fails to perform these functions other actors can move into the gaps that exist.
4 Myanmar’s army (Selth 1995:237).
5 Regarding the categorization of Myanmar as a weak state see e.g. Karetnikov (2004:49);
Pedersen, Rudland, May (2000) and Englehart (2005). Will categorizes Myanmar as a “weak or
failing state” (Will 2004).
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While Rotberg especially refers to warlords and other criminal non-state actors
(Rotberg 2004:6ff.), Risse also identifies economic actors, NGOs, family clans
and other local groups that practise alternative forms of governance in sectors of
state weakness or failure (Risse 2005:8-12). Some of these groups account for
civil society actors in line with the definition which forms the theoretical basis
of this article. This pattern of civil society emerging in gaps which are left by
the state is highly relevant for Myanmar, where the state apparatus fails with
regard to many of its core functions. And it is in these gaps that the national civil
society has been re-emerging in recent years.
The state of Myanmar can be considered as being particularly weak with
regard to the core function of providing for the welfare of the national population.
The severe humanitarian crisis provides bitter evidence for this failure of the
welfare system. Furthermore, certain ethnic minority areas are not under the
direct control of the central state, which limits its territorial power monopoly.
Since 1989 the regime has concluded ceasefire arrangements with most of the
armed ethnic resistance groups, thereby granting them some degree of autonomy.
As a result, some room for manoeuvre exists for civil society actors in the sector
of welfare provision and in certain territories with a degree of ethnic autonomy –
and especially where these two areas of state weakness coincide or overlap.
3.2 The Weakness of the State-Run Education System
The weak performance of the state in the sector of education can be considered
as only one devastating example of the general failure of the state ofMyanmar to
perform its welfare function. Even though hard empirical evidence is very hard
to come by, it is interesting that the failure of the state-run education system even
becomes evidentwhen reading (between the lines of) the government propaganda
(see below).
Indeed, in certain rural areas government schools do not exist at all. Fur-
thermore, schools are mostly poorly equipped and usually lack basic teaching
materials such as benches, tables and books. Even though education is supposed
to be compulsory and free there are many unofficial allowances which parents
have to pay, such as fees for the enrolment of their children or financial contribu-
tions to the maintenance of school buildings. Moreover, parents also have to buy
school uniforms and books for their children, which many poor people cannot
afford. As a consequence, they often take their children out of school. According
to various voices from within the country more than 50 per cent of all children
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drop out of school before they even finish the primary level, which means that
they completely fall through the cracks of the state-run education system. In this
respect, it is noteworthy that even according to – in all likelihood embellished
– statistics published by the Ministry of Education (MOE) the completion rate
of primary school is just slightly above 70 per cent (MOE 2007a:21, MOE
2007b:1 and 5).6 The drop-out problem is also reflected by the recent govern-
ment initiative to establish so-called post-primary schools (MOE 2007a:7, MOE
2007b:2). As in many poor and rural areas there are only primary and no middle
or high schools.7 Some government primary schools have been “upgraded” to
post-primary schools which means that they now teach up to the sixth, seventh
or eighth grade as well (MOE 2007b:2). It has already been mentioned that it is,
of course, also due to poverty that children drop out of school after finishing the
primary level even if there might be a government-run secondary school in the
immediate vicinity. In any case, the post-primary programme seems to reflect a
somehow desperate attempt of the government to keep children in school, be
it only one or two years more than their primary school attendance. As one
high-ranking government official of the Ministry of Education aptly admitted
himself, “Otherwise (i.e. without post-primary schools, my own remarks) they
drop out after primary.”
Apart from the problems mentioned, teachers are often only poorly trained
and teaching methods tend to be repetitive, outdated, teacher-centred and based
on ex-cathedra teaching. Among others, twomain reasons for the poor training of
teachers can be identified. Firstly, the state-run teachers training system has been
constantly deteriorating. Even the Ministry of Education itself admits that not
all teachers have an academic qualification or even “attended certified courses”
(MOE 2006)8. Secondly, civil servants – including teachers and professors –
6 However, in public the government usually prefers to refer to the rate of (initial) enrolment
which it claims to be nearly 100 per cent. However, this figure too is strongly contested by
independent experts.
7 Experts from within the country have told this author that there is primary, middle and
high school and that primary and middle school have four grades each while high school has
two. Official sources from the Ministry of Education also divide the school system into primary,
middle and high school (MOE 2007a:6f.). However, recent publications of the Ministry of
Education suggest that the primary level officially has five grades instead of four (MOE 2007a:7,
MOE 2007b:2). In fact, it is conceivable that the situation might vary according to place and
circumstances. The post-primary programme could itself be mentioned as a case in point here.
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are generally very badly paid, which is why well-qualified people, especially
those who have obtained education and training abroad, usually have no interest
to become teachers. The national universities usually face similar problems as
the schools but, -more importantly, access to tertiary education is also highly
restricted and often subject to political loyalty to the regime. Moreover, there is
also an obvious lack of vocational skills training as well as a dearth of capacity
building in fields such as management, project-oriented work and even English,
which international organizations and businessmen active in Myanmar recognize
instantly as soon as they try to hire staff.
As a consequence of the weakness of the state-run education system at all
levels which has been depicted in this chapter, various commercial private schools
as well as computer, English and vocational training centres have been established
in recent years. Even though the certificates of these private education institutions
are not recognized by the government, most wealthy people prefer to send their
children there instead of sending them to a government school. As private
education is not legally provided for, these institutions are not allowed to register
with the Ministry of Education. As a makeshift solution most of them have
chosen to register with the Ministry of Commerce and officially operate as
businesses. Generally, enrolment and (note) monthly fees are very high and
mostly have to be paid in foreign currency. All of the private schools registered
with the Ministry of Commerce which the author visited were businesses in
the truest sense of the word due to the high fees which they requested. None
of them would have been interesting from the point of view of development
aid and poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, two aspects regarding these schools
are interesting in reference to the relational understanding of civil society and
worth more extensive research in the future. First, registering with the Ministry
of Commerce might in fact constitute a strategy for non-profit making and
thus more welfare oriented civil society-based initiatives to get a school started.
Second, and maybe even more importantly, many founders of and teachers at
such commercial private schools would probably claim that they represent civil
8 The information cited above is given in a rather cryptic and euphemistic way. It is claimed that
the “objective” of the government is “to increase the percentage of teachers having required (sic)
academic qualification (matriculated) to 96” and “the percentage of primary and middle school
teachers who have attended certified courses to 97” per cent respectively, both by the year 2005.
However, the source does not provide data about the status quo.
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society as well as identify themselves with the type of action and interaction
described as being characteristic for civil society.9
Apart from private commercial schools, non-profit self-help approaches to
the provision of educational services have also become ever more significant in
recent years due to the failure of the state in the education sector. The current
Myanmar Local NGO Directory, which only lists registered organizations with
an office in Yangon, already mentions 57 NGOs including monastic schools and
church-based organizations that engage in education (DLN 2005). Taking into
account that many civil society initiatives in Myanmar are informal and that their
scope of action is mostly very localized, the actual number of self-help groups in
the education sector can comfortably be expected to be much higher. The article
now concentrates on depicting some of these civil society activities, focusing first
on government-controlled and then on ceasefire areas.
4 Civil Society Activities in Education: Government-Controlled
Areas
4.1 Monastic Schools
The most prominent civil society actors that are active in the education sector
in government-controlled areas are monastic schools or monastic education
centres as they are often called. Throughout the history ofMyanmar, monastic
education has been crucial as a means of providing the country’s ordinary citizens
with a basic education. Today, in some rural areas, monasteries are in fact the
only educational institutions that exist (Brandon 1998:235). Monastic schools
especially reach out to poor children, are free of any charges and the teaching
materials are mostly provided to the children. Some specifically target street
children and orphans and not only teach them but also provide them with food
and accommodation. In fact, many monastic education centres also serve as
orphanages, or vice versa. Some of these orphanages have established their own
medical and income-generating facilities such as tailor shops and carpentries.
Moreover, as monastic orphanages mostly lack the money to pay any staff, their
9 Two founders of such commercial private schools have in fact told this author that they
considered their initiatives as civil society activities. However, members of Myanmar’s business
community as a whole often claim that they are civil society actors, both because it is still quite
difficult to run successful businesses which are independent from government interference in
Myanmar and because they sometimes seem to use this as a strategy to receive foreign support.
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pupils usually not only have to cook and wash for themselves but they also
have to take care of the maintenance of school buildings and other facilities.
Consequently, monastic education centres are typically highly self-organized.
Financially, however, most of them depend on donations from local communities
or, in some cases, international donors and friends. Mostly with the help of
international friends or donor organizations, some monastic schools have also
managed to establish libraries with relatively rich collections of books.
There are various types of monastic schools, but there seem to be three main
categories: The first category of monastic schools confines itself to imparting
Buddhist teachings. The second category is constituted by monastic schools
which consider it their main task to impart Buddhist teachings but which, at the
same time, also teach children basic literacy skills. These second type monastic
schools are unable to hold exams or to award their pupils certificates which
are recognized by the government though. However, the third category of
monastic schools are those that adopt the government curriculum. In other
words this means that they engage in formal education. This indicates that they
deliberately try to fill a gap in the state-run education system by teaching the
government curriculum to children whose parents cannot afford to send them to
a government school.
According to official government figures 1,183 of these third type monastic
schools are recognized by the government in a kind of co-education system. They
seem to be registered with both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs. According to the same source, these 1,183 schools reached
158,040 pupils in the 2003-2004 academic year (MOE 2006:25). If monastic
schools are recognized by the government, their pupils also have the possibility
to acquire an officially recognized degree. They can either do their final exams
at a government school or they can do them at their respective monastic school,
which then, however, has to send them to the ministry responsible for marking
and issuing the certificates.10 For officially recognized monastic schools there
10 During my field study in summer 2006 several experts as well as teachers at monastic schools
said that officially recognized monastic schools were registered with the Ministry of Education
and that it was also the Ministry of Education to which all officially recognized monastic schools
had to send their pupils’ final exams for marking. However, during another research trip in
early spring 2007 high ranking officials from the Ministry of Education claimed that all monastic
schools were under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Nevertheless, a publication of the Ministry
of Education itself claims both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs to
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also seems to be a kind of bridge system, which makes it possible for pupils to
change from monastic to government schools. If, for example, pupils complete
the primary level at an officially recognized monastic school, they sometimes
appear to be allowed to do a special test. If they pass this test, they can get
accepted at a government middle school.
According to other official statistics, which the author obtained from a UN
agency active in the country and which are largely in accordance with the official
source MOE 2006 cited above, the majority of all officially recognized monastic
schools teach at the primary level or at the so-called post-primary level.11 Some,
butmuch fewer, officially recognized monastic schools teach at the middle level.12
Furthermore, two to five officially recognized monastic schools were reported to
the author to teach at the high school level.13 Moreover, there are also various
monastic education centres that engage in vocational skills training or computer
training activities. With regard to the figures cited, it should be noted that they
are likely to be incomplete due to a general lack of reliable data concerning almost
every aspect of politics in Myanmar. However, it is also crucial to stress yet
another aspect: Even though the figures indicate that monastic schools might not
be so numerous in present-day Myanmar, it is still obvious they make important
contributions to bridging some of the gaps in the state-run education system.
These schools specifically reach out to the poorest of the poor, who would
otherwise not have access to education at all.
be in charge of the officially recognized monastic schools (MOE 2006:25).
11 As monastic schools are in many places the only educational institutions that exist and mostly
teach at the primary level, many of them have adopted the government’s pattern of upgrading
primary to post-primary schools.
12 According to this second official source cited here, there are 1,158 officially recognized
monastic schools which altogether reach 161,492 children. According to the same source, 144,008
of these children are taught at the primary or post-primary level and only 17,484 are taught at
the middle level. However, the source does not give the number of schools which are active at
the primary level and at the middle level respectively.
13 This information about the number of monastic schools active at the high school level is not
backed by the official sources cited above. Instead, it is based on various interviews that the author
conducted in Myanmar in summer 2006. While some of the people interviewed claimed that five
monastic schools taught at the high school level, others said it were only two. The author herself
was able to visit one of them and read the funding proposal of a second one. Thus, the author can
confirm that there are at least two monastic schools active at the high school level. There might
be three more, but their existence could not be confirmed during this field study.
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Generally, most monastic schools teach novices and other children together14.
Moreover, teachers who work or volunteer atmonastic schools are not necessarily
always Buddhist monks. Indeed, quite often, Buddhist monasteries largely serve
as protective umbrellas for more secular educational initiatives taking place
under their auspices. Sometimes, for instance, monasteries simply provide their
compound and then invite professional teachers to volunteer.
Many monastic education centres provide their services regardless of race
and religion, but education is certainly conducted in accordance with Buddhist
values and principles. Indeed, the main purpose of some Buddhist education
programmes is to counter similar efforts by the Christian churches and prevent
people converting from Buddhism to Christianity. This pattern is especially
relevant with regard to those monastic schools which are also orphanages.
Even though not all of the children they care for are Buddhist, some monastic
orphanages require every child who wants to live in their compound to wear a
Buddhist novice’s robe. Even in orphanages where this is not the case, Christian
or Muslim children who live there are sometimes encouraged to convert to
Buddhism.
Monastic education centres vary both in size and in the degree to which they
are co-opted by the regime. While some only have a few dozen pupils, others
have between 100 and 800 (some big monastic schools have even more pupils,
but they are exceptions to the rule). Many rural Buddhist groups are localized
and centre on individual monks. While they are relatively independent, their
radius of action is necessarily limited to a few beneficiaries and their education
facilities and materials are often very basic. Even though they fulfil fundamental
welfare tasks, such informal initiatives are often invisible to Western donors
and consequently receive little or no foreign support (South 2004:248f.). By
contrast, large monastic schools are often granted a surprisingly large scope of
action at first glance. TheDhamma Buddhist Education Centre in Rangoon,15 for
example, runs its own medical and income-generating facilities such as a tailor’s
shop, a carpenters and a garage in order to make it self-sufficient. It teaches
14 The majority of the population in Myanmar is Buddhist. As a consequence, most children
who go to monastic schools practise Buddhism. Not all of them are novices though. Moreover,
in some cases even non-Buddhist children go to a monastic school for education, because there
are no government schools where they live (see below).
15 Organization known to the author; name and place changed for safety’s sake.
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several foreign languages and is allowed to invite foreign teachers and experts to
volunteer. In addition, it maintains a library with a relatively rich collection of
books. Moreover, it has a language laboratory and computer facilities and offers
computer training courses for pupils and teachers alike. However, this room
for manoeuvre is directly dependent on the personal contacts that the presiding
monk maintains or used to maintain with several high-ranking officials. While
such personal linkages with the ruling establishment compromise organizational
independence, they also protect the institution from repression. Although the
Dhamma Buddhist Education Centre receives no financial support from the state,
military officials have in the past paid public visits in order to take some of the
credit. In return, the institution has been granted considerable autonomy in
running its programmes up to the present day.
As a local university professor told this author, many of the monks who run
big monastic schools in Myanmar received their own education at the state-run
Theravada Buddhist University, an institution which can be considered as an
instrument of the government to promote but also to “purify” and control the
Buddhist faith. To sum up, in spite of co-option (or precisely because of it), the
Buddhist Sangha16 enjoys a measurable scope of action, which enables it to offer
essential educational services that the state fails to provide.
4.2 Community-Based Schools in Rural Areas
In rural areas community-based schools are crucial as a means of providing
village children with basic education and skills. Officially, the governmentmostly
portrays these education institutions as government schools, but in reality they
owe their existence to the engagement and the material contributions of the
respective local communities.
Just as there are many types of monastic schools, there are also various
patterns regarding the way in which community-based schools are established
and organized. Among others, the following scheme seems to be common: While
there is a government school (building) in the village, the government is unable
to recruit a village teacher. In fact, this is a very common problem in present-day
Myanmar. Professional teachers are usually highly reluctant to be transferred
to remote areas, especially as they receive no adequate financial compensation.
16 Community of Buddhist monks and nuns in Myanmar.
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As a consequence, local communities frequently establish informal groups and
collect money to pay the village teacher themselves. If no professional teacher is
prepared to work in the village, community-based groups sometimes even choose
a teacher among themselves. Mostly, these makeshift teachers are community
leaders who are respected persons and have a certain education as well as certain
skills but who have never been trained to be teachers.
Another frequent type of civil society action in rural areas follows a slightly
different pattern: Often, the next government school is too far away from the
village – for example, in a neighbouring village or town. In this case, local
community-based groups sometimes even construct the school building on their
own and then either share the teacher with the government school nearest to
their village or, as depicted above, also recruit and pay the teacher themselves.
Officially, the government mostly declares these community-based schools as
“extensions” to the government schools located nearest to them. In reality,
however, all the efforts and expenses to establish and run these schools have
been made by the respective local communities themselves.
4.3 Early Childhood Development, Non-formal Education, Free
Extra Tuition, Vocational Training and Capacity Building: The
Role of local NGOs
In government-controlled areas, local NGOs – be they Buddhist, Christian or
primarily secular – are unable to engage in formal education. Nevertheless, they
run certain worthwhile education programmes in the sectors of early childhood
development, non-formal education, free extra tuition, vocational skills training
and capacity building.
Early childhood development is aimed at children up to five. In this field, local
NGOs run nursery or pre-primary schools, where they basically seek to stimulate
creative thinking in children, which means that they mostly try to apply child-
centred methods and participatory approaches. Some of the NGOs interviewed
even claimed that they practised theMontessori approach. Apart from playing and
singing songs with them, nursery school teachers usually also teach preschoolers
the Myanmarese and the English alphabet. Mostly, local NGOs try to work
in close co-operation with local communities. Indeed, according to one NGO
worker, a number of local communities already have their own programmes in
place but lack the skills necessary to efficiently promote skills and knowledge in
a way which is suitable for children. Consequently, the main activity of NGOs
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that engage in this sector is often to teach community leaders how to run proper
early childhood development programmes on their own.
Another field some local NGOs work in is non-formal education. In this
field they mostly work with street children and school drop-outs, provide them
with food and accommodation and teach them both basic literacy skills and
vocational skills in order to enable them to earn their living and stand on their
own feet. According to one international NGO worker, NGOs active in non-
formal education often try to develop their curriculum in close cooperation with
their target groups and frequently readapt it to their beneficiaries’ needs. It
should be noted, however, that non-formal education is a highly sensitive area
of engagement even for local civil society actors and that a lot of programmes
in this field have been stopped. Likewise, some local NGOs have been waiting
for the official approval of planned non-formal education programmes for such
a long time that they have become uncertain whether they will ever be able to
get them started. As a consequence, many local NGOs have opted to engage in
less controversial education support activities. For instance, some local NGOs
give grants to poor parents whose children are enrolled in government schools
but who – without this support – would have to take their children out of school
and send them to work due to financial constraints. Other education-support
activities of localNGOs include the establishment of free hostels for poor children
who come from remote areas in order to seek education and training in the cities.
It should also be mentioned that localNGOs that are active in early childhood
development or in non-formal education are unable to work or even register
with the Ministry of Education. Instead, they usually register and – if possible
– cooperate with the Ministry of Social Welfare, which is formally in charge of
early childhood development. Indeed, the fact that the Ministry of SocialWelfare
is responsible for early childhood development programmes seems to provide
a small window of opportunity for local NGOs to get involved in education at
all. This ministry seems to be a bit less suspicious of private education-oriented
initiatives than the Ministry of Education itself.
The NGO activity that might be considered as coming closest to formal
education is free extra tuition. Local NGOs as well as engaged individuals run
all sorts of free extra tuition programmes in order to help children who have
problems at government school but are unable to pay for extra tuition. Many
free extra tuition programmes specifically target pupils who have problems in
English as well as pupils who are preparing for their matriculation examination.
71 71
71 71
Myanmar’s Civil Society 71
While free extra tuition is always a well-meant endeavour and undoubtedlymight
often help children, it should be noted that it can also be counterproductive; the
quality varies. What is more, with the state-run education system deteriorating
it has become common practice for parents all over Myanmar to send their
children to one of the many extra tuition programmes that exist, be they with
costs or free of charge. As a result, some ten-year old children who this author
spoke to spend almost all of their day in class going to the government school
in the morning, to an extra tuition with costs in the afternoon and to another
free extra tuition in the evening – sometimes as late as nine or ten o’clock. With
the absorptive capacity of a ten year old child being unquestionably limited and
the quality of free extra tuitions often inadequate the impact of some of these
programmes becomes questionable.
Another field of local NGO engagement is vocational training which regards
training activities in professional areas as different as nursing, medical training,
tailoring, agriculture and accounting. Moreover, some NGOs offer computer
training courses which mostly focus on basic Microsoft Office skills. Due to
financial constraints, most NGOs rely on the voluntary engagement of their
teachers and trainers. While it is often local pensioners who act as voluntary
teachers in NGO vocational training courses, some NGOs have also managed to
invite international experts to volunteer for a limited period of time. None of
these vocational training courses can earn the participants an officially recognized
degree though. However, NGO workers often help their students to find a job
after completing the course – by writing recommendation letters to possible
future employers, for instance. In actual fact, some local NGOs have already
established a network of contacts with local enterprises and employers which
helps them to place their former students in a job.
Moreover, the local NGO community has initiated various types of capacity
building initiatives in fields such as project management, proposal writing, finan-
cial accounting, community organizing, leadership skills, conflict management
and English in order to train its own new generation of staff as well as local people
who want to work with international (aid) organizations and NGOs active in the
country. Apart from local aid workers, the beneficiaries of these capacity building
initiatives are often community leaders such as pastors or socially engaged local
businessmen because these people can potentially act as trainers themselves and
pass their skills on to other people in their communities. One local NGO known
to the author relies on self-education methods and has in the past been able to
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invite foreign experts for seminars and trainings. The certificates that students
can acquire after completing NGO capacity building courses are not recognized
by the government. However, they are usually recognized within the community
of local NGOs and international NGOs active in Myanmar. Moreover, at least
one NGO which the author visited had found a way to have its certificates
accredited by an international education institution. As there are no adequate
state-run training programmes in the field of development aid, these capacity
building initiatives have meanwhile come to present an important means for the
local as well as international community of aid workers in Myanmar to train and
recruit its own staff.
4.4 Parent-teacher Associations (PTAs) Provide Basic Educational
Facilities at the Boundary between Civil Society and the State
Parent-teacher associations (PTAs) have become ever more active in recent years.
In many towns and regions of Myanmar, these groups consisting of parents and
schoolteachers are the only actors to lay the foundations for basic education.
Because the state often fails to provide even the most basic educational facilities
and materials, PTAs collect money for textbooks and take care of the basic
maintenance of school buildings. Some PTAs have even managed to establish
links to each other, thereby forming a network, which indicates that their
degree of organization is increasing. Moreover, various PTAs have contacts with
international organizations that not only support them financially, but also make
them familiar with modern approaches to teaching and interactive learning. In
this sense, PTAs perform a central role in filling the gaps that exist in the sector
of education due to state weakness.
Due to the worthwhile contributions of their members with regard to service
delivery, PTAs at least to some degree can be said to account for civil society
actors in the relational sense, particularly as some of them were reported to the
author to practise deliberative forms of decision making, such as voting their
own chairpersons. This means that at least to some extent they practise the
mode of action and interaction defined as being characteristic for civil society.
Nevertheless, whether PTAs can be described as genuine civil society institutions
is questionable. The teachers who are members of these organizations are usually
part of the state-run education system. Moreover, the government more often
than not seems to require parents whose children are enrolled to pay obligatory
fees to the local PTAs. In fact, the government has relied on the contributions
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of PTAs since the socialist period. In many cases these links with the state-run
education system adversely affect the ability of PTAs to operate in a self-organized
and self-reliant way and thus curtail the extent to which these organizations can
realize the type of action and interaction characteristic for civil society. Hence,
PTAs are better described as being located at the boundary between civil society
and the state. It could be argued, however, that this boundary shifts considerably
as soon as the teachers involved are not state officials but community leaders
who teach at community-based schools. Most notably so, because it is also
conceivable that in such areas where a government education system does not
exist the local population might be much less – or even not at all – subject to
government pressures to pay obligatory fees to the PTAs, as both the PTAs and
the schools themselves are then genuinely voluntary community initiatives rather
than state-controlled.
In any case, for the international donor community the cooperation with
PTAs might actually provide a window of opportunity precisely because of their
rather hybrid character. The connections which PTAs by nature have with the
state apparatus could potentially enable international aid workers to engage with
civil society and the local state at the same time, thereby fostering cooperation
between the two as well.
5 Civil Society Activities in Education: Ceasefire Areas
As mentioned above, since 1989 the regime has negotiated ceasefires with most
of the armed ethnic resistance groups, thereby granting them some degree of
autonomy. In some cases, this degree of autonomy also extends to education. The
Kachin IndependenceOrganization (KIO), for instance, has formal administrative
autonomy over its area and is allowed to have its own department for education.
Moreover, the KIO runs several other education institutions such as a Teachers
Training School (ICG 2003:9). In the Special Region 4 in Northern Shan State
schools run by the central government exist alongside Chinese schools and so-
called self-reliance schools which the Educational Department of the Special
Region 4 is in charge of. As a result of this increase in ethnic autonomy many
of the ceasefire agreements have led to the emergence or enlargement of spaces
for civil society activities in the sector of welfare provision in general and in the
sector of education in particular (Smith 1999:37-49; Purcell 1999:89ff.; South
2004:233). Moreover, due to decades of civil war most ethnic minority areas are
faced with enormous problems of underdevelopment. While the regime is mostly
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unable or unwilling address these grievances itmight still be afraid that the armed
resistance groups will call off the ceasefires due to economic frustration. This
may be another important reason why the military regime allows development
projects to be conducted by civil society actors, particularly in ethnic minority
areas (ICG 2001:23). Consequently, just as in government-controlled areas, it is
mostly in the sector of welfare provision that civil society activities have been
allowed to emerge in ethnic territories.
5.1 Christian Churches and their Role in Education
Probably themost important civil society actors in the education sector in ceasefire
areas are Myanmar’s Christian churches. As most Christians in Myanmar belong
to ethnic minority groups, the Christian churches are mostly active in ethnic
minority areas. This is not to suggest, however, that the welfare services of the
Christian churches in Myanmar are generally confined to non-Burman ethnic
nationalities or Christians. Many of them rather deliver their services regardless
of ethnicity and religion. Education programmes are however usually conducted
in accordance with Christian values and principles.
Until 1962, various Christian denominations in Myanmar ran their own
officially registered schools up to high school level. Even though the churches
had already encountered some serious restrictions before, after the military
coup in 1962 these schools were finally either nationalized or simply closed
down. Myanmar’s Christian churches have been prohibited from running
officially recognized schools or register any other education programmes with
the Ministry of Education ever since. Nevertheless, many educational initiatives
exist under the religious umbrella of the Christian churches up to the present
day.
In ceasefire areas, the contributions which Myanmar’s Christian churches
make to bridging some of the gaps that exist in the state-run education system
often go hand in hand with community-based self-help initiatives, such as the
establishment of community-based schools depicted above. There are various
forms of cooperation between local churches, local communities and even local
government institutions which are aimed at providing basic education in ceasefire
areas. In many rural ethnic areas, for example, there are no government schools
at all. As a consequence, local communities often construct a school building on
their own and, subsequently, the local church or bible school provides the teacher
(May Oo 2004). Another common scheme seems to be that the government
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provides the physical educational infrastructure such as a school building but
– just as in remote areas under government control – is unable to pay for a
teacher. In such cases again, teachers are often provided by the respective local
church organizations. Another important contribution local churches in ethnic
minority areas frequently make is to provide books and other teaching materials
to government schools that lack the financial means to purchase these materials
themselves.
Furthermore, according to a leading church official, Myanmar’s Christian
churches run about 1,500 nursery or pre-primary schools all over the country
and in ethnic minority areas specifically. Apart from playing and singing songs,
children who go to church-based pre-primary schools also learn the Myanmarese
and the English alphabet as well as the alphabet of their respective ethnic language.
However, what seems to be somewhat sensitive is that the Christian churches
tend to consider the pre-primary schools as missionary instruments. Interestingly,
up to now church-based pre-primary schools seem to have been relatively free
to formulate their own curriculum and set their topics as long as they refrained
from criticizing the regime. Recently, the government seems to have become a bit
wary of these church-based education institutions though. As a consequence, it is
currently planning to develop certain guidelines for the curricula of church-based
pre-primary schools. However, as the authorities regarding this matter seem to be
divided or even disputed between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of
SocialWelfare, this plan so far seems to exist on paper only. Moreover, according
to one source the government has announced that in the future teachers working
at church-based pre-primary schools needed to be trained by the government.
While this measure would definitely curtail the independence of these Christian
schools, it remains highly questionable whether the government actually has
the capacities necessary to implement it. One church worker said that his / her
organization did not really worry about this plan, since the government only had
the capacities necessary to train 50 pre-primary school teachers per year which
with regard to the 1,500 church-run pre-primary schools already in existence
was totally insufficient.
Other education support activities of the Christian churches in ethnic minority
areas include the provision of free extra tuition and the maintenance of hostels
that are free of any charges. Free extra tuition programmes aimed at helping
children who have problems at government school are either conducted by staff
members of local church organizations or run by private volunteers and local
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community leaders for whose activities the local churches provide protective
umbrellas. While church-run hostels that are free of any charges do not constitute
educational institutions per se, they are of crucial importance for many pupils
from remote ethnic minority areas nevertheless. As many villages in ethnic
minority areas are small and very remote, secondary schools are mostly far away.
As a consequence, many poor parents can only send their children to a secondary
school if there is a free, church-run hostel in the town where the school is located.
Moreover, there are about 30 Christian colleges – or so-called Seminaries –
all over the country and in ethnic minority areas especially. The Seminaries can
be attended after matriculation. Their prime mission is to teach Bible Studies,
but as most of the books they use are in English, they also impart good spoken
and written English skills. What is more, the Seminaries currently also seem to be
attempting to establish a Bachelor of Arts system. If this attempt was successful,
this would mean that apart from Bible Studies Seminary students could also study
some secular subjects such as English and economics. Just as many monastic
schools, some Seminariesare highly self-organized. Often, students live in the
compound of the Seminary because their home towns or villages are far away.
One such Christian college which the author visited not only had its own cooking
and basic medical facilities but also a number of sewing machines so that the
students could mend and make their own clothes. Moreover, the students had
to take turns in the kitchen as well as in cleaning the compound. In theory, all
important decisions were supposed to be made by the founder and principal of
the Seminary. However, he / she usually had to travel a lot and thus in practice a
committee of teachers administered the college. Students were allowed to form
a students’ council which was in charge of organizing community activities such
as sports competitions.
The Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT) in Rangoon serves as a Christian
University and issues Bachelor’s as well as Master’s degrees. Even though it
provides tertiary education, it is registered as a religious and not as an educational
institution. Students at MIT can not only study theology but also choose among
a limited number of secular subjects including English and economics. The
degrees that students can earn from the Christian colleges and from MIT are
not recognized by the government. As a consequence, some of the students
who study there also follow a long-distance education course at a government
university at the same time. However, the degrees of MIT and the Christian
colleges are recognized within the national Christian community with which
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most of the students seek employment after completing their education. Some
of these tertiary Christian education institutions also resort to alternative accredi-
tation methods such as having certificates accredited by international education
associations. Moreover, as one church organization representative stressed, the
problem in Myanmar is usually not to get a certificate but rather to acquire
worthwhile skills and good quality education. Some teachers at the MIT and at
the national Christian colleges have studied abroad and, as a consequence, are
often highly qualified.
A generally very interesting aspect is that Myanmar’s Christian churches
have managed to establish and maintain national network structures, such as
the Myanmar Baptist Convention (MBC), the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and
the Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC) (ICG 2003:17). This aspect distin-
guishes the Christian churches from the Buddhist Sangha which tends to have a
much more localized and decentralized organizational structure. These network
structures constitute a great asset with regard to the coordination of the various
national church-based educational activities. The MCC, for example, provides
capacity building programmes such as teachers training and constitutes a common
forum for member churches where they can exchange experiences and discuss
about their activities in the education sector. Moreover, the MCC maintains
some education support programmes which aim at financing scholarships for
gifted students to study abroad. However, these scholarship programmes have
not always been successful in the past because many beneficiaries have chosen
to stay and work abroad instead of coming back to Myanmar in order to work
in their own communities. Apart from the educational programmes mentioned,
the women department of the MCC runs vocational training courses in various
professional fields. Other MCC departments run capacity building programmes
in the sectors of humanitarian and development aid, which the MCC also engages
in.
5.2 Culture and Literature Committees and their Role in
Education
In recent years, the regime has allowed various ethnic minority parties to issue
publications in their own ethnic and local languages, which would have been
unthinkable before the ceasefires. Following this increase in ethnic autonomy, civil
society initiatives in the sectors of culture and literature have been mushrooming.
As the Culture and Literature Committees are legal organizations which exist
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in almost every ethnic village, a lot of different activities take place under these
umbrellas. Specifically, most Culture and Literature Committees focus in some
way on literacy and teach children and illiterate adults important spoken and
written language skills. As early as the year 2000, 46,000 primary-school children
in Mon State and 27,000 in Shan State were able to attend language courses in
their own ethnic tongues (Smith 2002:26).
Most Culture and Literature Committees teach the local ethnic language of
their respective region and mainly rely on community education approaches
such as informal education programmes and summer schools. Others, however,
already seem to have incorporated Myanmarese and other non-culture-related
subjects into their curriculum. In fact, one UN representative active in the
country told this author that some Culture and Literature Committees were
even able to engage in formal education and had adopted the government
curriculum, especially in Mon State. Just like the Buddhist monastic schools
and the educational institutions run by Christian churches, most Culture and
Literature Committees are active at the primary education level. However, there
also seem to be some that teach at a higher level and impart a number of skills.
The Mon Culture and Literature Committee has conducted educational
projects and produced publications in collaboration with the Buddhist Sangha
(ICG 2003:18). In predominantly Christian areas it is mostly the Christian
churches and church-related organizations that – in cooperation with Culture
and Literature Committees and other communal actors – help to promote ethnic
languages and address basic educational needs, which the central government
is unable or unprepared to tackle itself. While ethnic Cultureand Literature
Committees teach members of their respective ethnic communities important
spoken and written language skills, at least some of them tend to exclude members
of other ethnic groups. Consequently, in spite of their worthwhile educational
activities Culture and Literature Committees potentially also bear the risk of
being culturally divisive, thereby reinforcing ethnic cleavages.
6 In a nutshell
So far, this article has provided a number of informational details about the
multifaceted ensemble of civil society groups that are active in Myanmar’s
education sector. Before moving towards a conclusion, it seems to be useful to
summarize the most important common features of civil society initiatives in the
field of education as well as the major differences between them.
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Firstly, there are quite a lot of community-based initiatives in the sector of edu-
cation, if we define this sector broadly. However,most of these community-based
groups cannot engage in (formal) education directly. Instead, they are confined
to providing physical support to schools. For instance, their education support
activities include the construction and maintenance of school buildings. More-
over, these groups often donate money, benches and school books to government
and community-based-schoolsalike or pay for village teachers’ salaries. Secondly,
there are a number – but definitely much fewer – civil society groups that can en-
gage in education more directly. Most of them apply informal, community-based
approaches to teaching, whereas only a few groups have managed to involve
in formal education and to be allowed to teach the government curriculum so
far. Among the groups that are able to engage in formal education, monastic
schools or monastic education centres are undoubtedly the most prominent.
Thirdly, most educational initiatives which are aimed at children take place at
the primary or even at the pre-primary level. While there are some at the middle
level, only a handful exists at the high school level. However, there are several
educational initiatives for (young) adults in the sectors of vocational skills training
and capacity building. Fourthly, most educational initiatives take place under
religious umbrellas, such as Buddhist monasteries or Christian churches. Even
groups that are registered as NGOs often have a religious background. Indeed,
this pattern of civil society action is very common in Myanmar and not unique
to the field of education. If they are conducted under the auspices of a religious
organization, civil society initiatives generally seem to be perceived as being less
political and therefore less threatening by the regime. Last but not least, it should
be acknowledged that even though the number of civil society initiatives in the
education sector has been increasing during the last years, the government is
still extremely suspicious of private educational initiatives. Accordingly, private
education has not been legally provided for as of yet. As a consequence, the
grand majority of the civil society groups that are active in Myanmar’s education
sector cannot register with the Ministry of Education. As a makeshift solution
some of them have chosen to register with the Ministry of Social Welfare or the
Ministry of Religious Affairs. So far, the governmentally recognized monastic
schools remain to be the only civil society-based education institutions which
can officially engage in formal education.17
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7 Conclusion
Civil society activities do exist in Myanmar and their room for manoeuvre can
be identified by using a relational approach. The state apparatus of Myanmar is
weak with regard to many of its core functions. Spaces open up for civil society
actors within such areas of state weakness. This tendency is particularly relevant
with regard to the failure of the country’s welfare state. Correspondingly, civil
society initiatives have been emerging in areas where the state-run education
system is weak or failing.
Civil society actors make worthwhile contributions to bridging some of the
gaps that exist in Myanmar’s state-run education system. Nevertheless, they lack
both the influence and the capacity necessary to adequately patch it up. Generally,
two main reasons can be identified for this conclusion. Firstly, Myanmar’s civil
society in itself constitutes a patchwork and not a coherent and co-ordinately
acting entity. If we look at the ensemble of civil society activities in the sector of
education, we see many small-scale initiatives. However, they are mostly very
localized and lack meaningful connections with each other. Besides, in view of
the numerous deficits and weaknesses that exist in the state-run education system,
it seems to be justified to wonder whether this system can still be patched up
at all. In other words, the gaps that exist in Myanmar’s education system are
too immense for civil society actors to be able to provide more than makeshift
solutions to specific local problems here and there. Secondly, the ensemble of
civil society groups that are active in Myanmar’s education sector mirrors many
of the deficits and weaknesses of the state-run education system in the gaps
of which it operates. For example, the quality of education that is provided
by civil society groups varies largely and is sometimes highly inadequate. Just
like professional teachers at government schools, voluntary teachers who teach
at community-based schools or run free extra tuition programmes are often
only poorly trained and frequently rely on outdated teaching methods. As a
consequence, tuition is often conducted in a highly hierarchical and repetitive way.
17 It has also been mentioned in chapter 5.2 that some Culture and Literature Committees in
Mon State seem to have managed to adopt the government curriculum as well. However, this
seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, there are no indications that these
Culture and Literature Committees are able to register with the Ministry of Education or that
there is bridge system comparable to the one that exists for governmentally recognized monastic
schools for them as well.
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This is far from surprising, because the inadequate qualification of private and
voluntary teachers directly results from the weakness of the state-run education
system under which they received their own education and training.
If we extrapolate these conclusions, the case study of civil society initiatives in
Myanmar’s education sector is also highly suggestive with regard to the broader
theoretical discussion. Firstly, it provides strong evidence for the assumption
in the research on failed states that state weakness can be conducive to the
emergence of civil society.18 Where the state fails to perform its functions and
the population is faced with the need to attend to welfare and other governance
issues itself, self-help initiatives are likely to emerge, even if the regime is highly
authoritarian. Secondly, the findings of the present case study also correspond
with the proposition of the relational approach, that civil society seen in the
context of state weakness and authoritarianism mirrors the weaknesses and
deficits of the state in which is operates. The prerequisite for a healthy and
independent civil society – one that adheres to democratic norms such as flat
hierarchies, pluralistic tolerance, and dialogue – is the existence of a strong
democratic constitutional state. As this prerequisite has not been fulfilled in the
authoritarian context of Myanmar, civil society has taken on a different form
and mirrors many of the dark sides of the context of action it is operating in. In
a nutshell this can be observed in the way in which civil society groups conduct
their activities in the field of education. Free extra tuitions of varying quality
that are conducted in a teacher-centred and rather authoritarian way have been
mentioned as specific examples. However, it is also possible to identify some
general patterns regarding the way in which most civil society groups that are
active in Myanmar’s education sector organize and constitute themselves. These
patterns also reflect the context of state weakness and authoritarianism in which
these groups operate; and they are not unique to civil society groups in the
sector of education but they characterize civil society organization in Myanmar
at large. For example, civil society groups in Myanmar are sometimes exclusive
bodies, with membership and benefits confined to a specific ethnic or religious
group. Furthermore, their internal structure is often hierarchical, they do not
favour active participation by their members with respect to decision making,
and they sometimes lack transparency. Moreover, as regime constraints on civil
18 Compare Risse 2005:8-12. It is worth mentioning, however, that the research on weak states
and civil society theories have only very rarely been combined with each other as of yet.
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society remain considerable in Myanmar, the observation that social spaces exist
should not be misconstrued as ascribing any political negotiating power to the
emerging civil society organizations, which they do not have. Instead, they
are issue-orientated and mostly very localized. In order to be able to tackle
the welfare needs of their respective communities, civil society organizations
in Myanmar are obliged to stay away from politics and are consequently far
from performing an advocacy role, a task which is normally attributed to civil
society in democratic contexts. Moreover, in order to find a modus vivendi
under the current regime, civil society organizations in Myanmar often have to
keep up functional ties with members of the ruling establishment or even let
themselves become partially co-opted by the latter, which often gives them a
double identity.19 Consequently, Myanmar’s civil society is still at an embryonic
stage.
Coming back to civil society activities in Myanmar’s education sector particu-
larly, what are – against this backdrop – the policy options for international aid
organizations? In spite of their dark sides, civil society initiatives in Myanmar’s
education sector make highly worthwhile contributions, because they specifically
target very poor children who would otherwise not have access to basic edu-
cation at all. Moreover, even though the regime is generally suspicious of all
educational initiatives which are not conducted by the government itself, it still
seems to be more willing to let local civil society actors engage in education than
international NGOs. As a consequence, the international community should
focus on creating the enabling conditions for civil society actors in Myanmar’s
education sector to operate. First of all, civil-society-based educational initiatives
urgently need material support. However, civil society actors also need to be
given access to adequate capacity building aimed at both enhancing their profes-
sional qualifications and at making them more familiar with pupil-centred and
interactive teaching methods. Only if both theirmaterial needs and their need for
expertise are met, will civil society actors be able to improve the quality of their
19 However, bigger and more co-opted organizations also often seem to act as protective um-
brellas for smaller and more independent initiatives operating under their auspices. Generally, the
Christian churches tend to be a bit more independent than the Buddhist monasteries. However,
the grand majority of the population of Myanmar is Buddhist. Consequently, the churches are
marginalized with regard to their number and their relative independence does not result into
strong negotiating position vis à vis the state.
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education programmes. However, with the current regime being so suspicious
of international engagement in the sector of education specifically, it will be a
big challenge for the international community to find ways of providing support
to local civil society actors in the education sector in a way that is not dangerous
for them. While it might always be possible to channel money and donations to
them, capacity building initiatives – such as workshops and seminars – are much
more difficult to realize at the current stage. Indeed, some small civil society
organizations reported being questioned and harassed after inviting foreigners to
merely visit their education projects. A few bigger civil society-based education
institutions have in the past been allowed to invite foreign teachers and trainers to
volunteer. However, these institutions usually tend to keep certain relations with
members of the ruling establishment, which many donors might feel uneasy with.
Apart from the problems mentioned, the embryonic civil society in Myanmar’s
education sector is only rarely able to live up to Western donor guidelines and
expectations. As most civil society initiatives in Myanmar are small and informal,
they are usually unfamiliar with the formal requirements of donor organizations
such as proposal writing, accounting and monitoring.
In view of the chances and challenges which are likely to arise from any future
engagement with civil society actors in Myanmar’s education sector, it will first of
all be necessary to conduct more research in order to get a better understanding
of the conditions on the ground. In point of fact, several international aid
organizations active in the country have told this author that they lack information
about the state of civil society initiatives in the education sector. They need
broad-based and reliable field studies in order to be able to step up their work in
this field. However, what yet seems to be obvious is that cooperation should be
started from least-controversial areas. Increasing financial and material support
for monasticeducation centres might be a good first step. Buddhist monastic
schools not only reach out to the poorest of the poor but they are also deeply
rooted in the local communities. Moreover, they are conceded a comparatively
large scope of action by the government and often face less restriction than other
local civil-society actors that engage in education. Furthermore, the training of
trainers bymeans of providing scholarships to civil society leaders to study abroad
is also possible in quite a number of cases. Another important aspect which the
international aid community needs to consider has already been hinted at: Civil
society is far away from constituting a viable alternative to a functioning state-run
education system. Moreover, if the state-run education system deteriorates
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further, this will also affect civil society-based educational initiatives in a negative
way, since they tend to mirror the deficits of the state-run education system.
Consequently, the capacity of civil society groups that engage in education and
the capacity of the state-run education system need to be built up simultaneously.
What is more, cooperation measures aimed at building up state capacity in the
education sector could also help in identifying reform-oriented forces within
the state-run education system and sensitize them to the need of granting civil
society actors some room for manoeuvre in areas where the state-run education
system fails. To sum up, identifying local partners, channelling material support
into community-based education projects and detecting groups within the state
apparatus who are willing to back such co-operations are all ways that remain
far from being fully explored.
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